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星期六, 三月 18, 2006
亚洲时报：脱胎换骨的日本令谁畏惧？
日本脱胎换骨 国际社会惧之
亚洲时报 Malcolm Cook and Huw McKay撰文／
过去几十年来，日本为何没有担当领导亚洲的大国角色一直是个疑问。而如今的问题是，日本与中国将如何相互竞争成为亚洲的领导者并扩大国际影响力。
以往人们对日本的认识是：经济上，金融行业拖累经济发展；政治上，幕府执政软弱无能；外交上，奉行金钱外交及和平主义政策。
然而，今天的日本与10年前相比已经发生了令人难以想像的变化。
去年，日本股市超过了其他七大工业国集团（G7）的成员，创下了41%的股票收益。日本还与农业出口大国墨西哥签署了自由贸易协定，与其他国家的自由贸易谈判仍在进行中。在外交上，日本威胁要减少其支付的联合国会费，宣称中国为“威胁”，更向台独势力分子签发旅游入境签证。军事上，日本自卫队（Self-Defense Forces）在未经联合国同意下向伊拉克出兵。15年前，尽管联合国批准了，而且在美国的压力下，日本也不愿向第一次海湾战争出兵。
日本的转变是因为东京对经济、政治及外交等方面进行了深层次的改革。经过改革，日本变得更加自信和自我，也因此在国际社会上引起了更大的争议。同时，由于中国的崛起以及北韩的局势，日本的战略环境也变得更加不稳定。在改革当中，越来越多的日本人希望发挥本国难以匹敌的经济与军事实力，而北韩乃至国际环境的不安定因素也进一步刺激了这种想法。
日本的政治改革着实令人目瞪口呆。如今几乎没有党派团体主张和平自保的外交策略，而社会民主党（Social Democratic Party）只剩下一具空壳。虽然日本继续向伊拉克增兵，但执政的自民党（Liberal Democratic Party）在去年的大选中仍然成为国会第二大党。日本首相小泉纯一郎（Junichiro Koizumi）及最大的在野党──民主党（Democratic Party of Japan）的领袖前原诚司（Seiji Maehara）均公开表示考虑修改和平宪法中的反战条款。
在大选中惨败之后，民主党挑选了外形良好的右派政客前原诚司担任党主席。这表明民主党有意向魅力不减的小泉学习。小泉是日本政坛几十年来最具影响力的政治家。前原和小泉都是愿意向党派传统挑战、有自主想法的鹰派领导人。在前首相村山富市（Tomiichi Murayama）和宫泽喜一（Kiichi Miyazawa）的时代过去后，日本的政治环境已经悄然发生了巨大的变化。
新一代的日本领导人所背负的二战历史负担较轻，对亚洲邻国的反日情绪不以为意，而且更迎合独立性强的城市选民的口味。他们正在逐步从长期占统治地位的保守官僚手中夺取国家的权力。因此日本今天的政坛更富朝气、攻击性和右翼倾向。
对外政策最能反映出日本更为自信的心态。不参加国外军事行动、联防安全、支持联合国、善用发展援助基金以及温和的中国政策曾是日本对外政策的核心内容。可是日本正在重新审视这一对外路线。
美国对日本结束战后占领后，日本最初采取了自保的对外政策，主要是为了改善与东亚邻国的关系。今天的日本更愿意发挥自己的实力挑战别国，甚至是邻国，而不愿意走金钱外交的路线。日本与美国进一步巩固了联盟关系，而日本在亚洲的战略利益也更具竞争性，而且受到国内政治考虑因素的影响更大。
日本正在调整其金钱外交政策，政府开始重视援助政策的实际效果。7年来，日本对外援助的预算减少了一半，从1999年155亿美元减少到去年的68亿美元。不过日本对印度的经济援助仍然有增无减。日本虽然是全球最大的债权国，但却不是提供国际发展援助基金的第一大国。
在削减对外经援的同时，日本还积极发展军事力量。日前，日本防卫厅长官额贺福志郎（Fukushiro Nukaga）要求日本自卫队承担国际维和的任务。日本不仅支援美国倡导的弹道防御系统，而且已获得了空中加油技术。此外，日本还发射了自制的间谍卫星，并考虑取消武器出口的禁令。可见，日本想在维护区域乃至世界安全方面扮演更为积极的角色。
在过去的40年里，日本的经济规模不断扩大，而且所有的资料曲线显示了良好的发展势头。
近7年来，市场信心有了很大的提高，日本Tankan调查报告显示企业信心自80年代泡沫经济以来首次攀上新高。失业率稳步下降，而东京宅用及商用土地的价格则在上涨。大量建筑起重机在“休息”多年后又重现在东京市区。去年，日本国内生产总值的增长率几乎是欧盟的2倍。
种种迹象显示，日本经济正在复苏，而且不会只是一个短暂的春天。首先，与1993年至1998年短暂的发展时期不同，目前促进日本经济发展的动力是消费需求以及资本支出的提高，财政纪律措施以及净出口国的地位反而阻碍了经济的发展。
其次，银行借贷业似乎已经渡过了“冰河期”。上个月，日本银行系统的贷款在5年来首次呈正值。各大银行都已成功摆脱了2/3以上的不良贷款。最后也是最重要的一点，大部分企业从资产负债表来看都已摆脱了泡沫经济的影响。泡沫经济的崩溃导致了许多企业长期资不抵债，被迫缩小规模。
如今，企业债务已经低于泡沫经济前夕的水平，而且不少公司已开始增加贷款为扩展做准备。
造成日本经济长期停滞的通货紧缩似乎也消失了。上星期，一向谨慎的日本银行决定调整目前向市场投入过量流动资金的“定量宽松”（quantitative easing policy）货币政策。而有关政府部门也在考虑取消“零利率”政策。
“定量宽松”以及“零利率”政策的取消将会对日元造成升值压力。在这种情况下，日元有可能再次冲击1美元兑100日元的高位。利率升高以及市场信心提升将会促进国内收益的提高，减少资金的外流。经济复苏最终会刺激进口，将鼓励国内企业增加投资。
不过，日本经济复苏将会降低国民对外投资的兴趣，进而给欧元带来贬值压力，以及刺激全球利率的升高。估计日本对美国的投资规模应该会减小。
日本的国内改革以及安全环境的变化都是结构性的，这为日本利用自身优势更好地发展提供了机遇。也许在未来的10年里，日本的防卫厅长官会经常飞往美国、澳大利亚以及新加坡等国家，推销最新的军事装备并鼓吹对中国和北韩实行强硬政策。可以预见美日同盟将会进一步巩固，一致对外，而日本维护本国利益的企图也会更加明显。当然，联合国的活动经费会被减少，而中国则会更惧怕遏制政策。
东北亚强国、大国林立，最壮观的国际竞争将会在这里上演，而日本绝不会坐壁上观。
本文作者马尔科姆·库克（Malcolm Cook）是悉尼罗维国际政策学院（Lowy Institute For International Policy）亚太问题研究项目的负责人。麦觊（Huw McKay）则是澳洲西太银行（Westpac Banking Corp）的高级经济分析师。
http://www7.chinesenewsnet.com/gb/MainNews/Topics/2006_3_17_14_7_54_528.html
·英文原文·
Who's afraid of the new Japan?
By Malcolm Cook and Huw McKay
For decades the question was, why wouldn't Japan grasp the empty mantle of Asian leadership? Today the question should be, how will Asia cope with Japan and China simultaneously competing for regional leadership and global influence?
The entrenched view of Japan is of a fragile economy held down by a moribund financial sector, a weak political system run by unaccountable shadow shoguns, and a meek international policy characterized by ineffectual checkbook diplomacy and pacifist isolation. Japan clearly has heft, but it lacks the will to use it.
However, the Japan of today is significantly different from the Japan of only a decade ago. Things are occurring now that even five years ago would have seemed impossible.
Last year the Japanese stock market topped its G7 peers, delivering a 41% return. Japan has signed a free-trade agreement with Mexico, a significant agricultural exporter, and is negotiating a slew of others. Undiplomatically, Japan is threatening to cut its funding to the United Nations, labeling China a "considerable threat", and issuing visitor visas to Taiwanese independence firebrands. Japanese Self-Defense Forces are in the midst of an extended mission in Iraq with no UN sanction. Fifteen years ago, Japan refused to contribute troops to the first Gulf War despite UN sanction and extreme US pressure.
Transformative changes sweeping across Japan's economy, political system and international policy explain the previously unexplainable. These transformations are making Japan more confident, assertive, self-interested and controversial. At the same time, Japan's strategic environment is becoming more uncertain with the rise of China and continued North Korean belligerence. Japan's internal transformations are building up the will to use its undoubted economic and military power, and changing strategic environments in Northeast Asia and globally are increasing the potential reasons to use it.
Political renewal
Japanese political transformation is truly eye-opening. Today, there is no institutional voice for pacifist isolation as the Social Democratic Party is now an empty shell. The Liberal Democratic Party won its second-largest share of seats ever in last year's election despite extending Japan's commitment to Iraq. Both Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and the leader of the opposition, Seiji Maehara, publicly contemplate revising the war-renouncing Article 9 of the constitution.
The deflated Democratic Party of Japan's choice of Maehara, a young, telegenic, right-leaning politician, as leader after its election debacle shows that it learned from the charismatic Koizumi, Japan's most powerful and colorful politician in decades. Today, Japan has two youngish, confident, hawkish political leaders willing to challenge party traditions and speak their minds. Each came to power by challenging his respective party's traditions. How the world of Japanese politics has changed since the days of prime ministers Tomiichi Murayama and Kiichi Miyazawa.
Japanese political leaders represent a new generation less burdened by memories of World War II and the US occupation, less sensitive to regional criticisms of Japanese assertiveness and more in tune with Japan's decisive and autonomous urban electorate. This new generation of leaders is also grasping the reins of state power away from the long-dominant but conservative bureaucracy. Japanese politics today is younger, edgier, more right-leaning and more executive-driven.
Foreign policy
International policy is where Japan's more assertive tone is clearest and most controversial. The four pillars of Japan's traditional power-shy international policy - no involvement in foreign military operations and collective security, strong support for the United Nations, heavy use of development aid, and a conciliatory approach to China - are all under serious review.
From the end of the postwar occupation Japan had a defensive international outlook primarily concerned with improving its image in East Asia. Today, Japan is more willing to use its power and to offend others, even its closest neighbors, and less willing to spend money to buy favor. Alliance relations with the US are tightening, while Japan's interests in Asia are becoming more competitive and increasingly driven by domestic political considerations.
Japan's checkbook is closing, while the government is keeping closer tabs on what it gets for its money. Japan's aid budget has been more than halved in the past seven years, falling from US$15.5 billion in 1999 to $6.8 billion in 2005. Aid to India, though, is rising. Japan is still the world's largest creditor, but it is no longer the largest source of country-to-country development aid.
At the same time that Japan has been cutting back on aid, it has been flexing its muscles. Defense Agency director Fukushiro Nukaga recently called for international peacekeeping to be one of the main duties of the Self-Defense Forces. Japan has committed to support the US ballistic-missile defense system, acquired in-air refueling capability, and launched its own state-of-the-art spy satellites, and it is considering lifting its ban on arms exports. Japan is increasingly a willing actor in regional and global security rather than simply a subject of it.
Economy transformed
Japan's economy is in the midst of its longest uninterrupted expansion in four decades, and all the trend lines are pointing in the right direction.
Business confidence has shown a marked improvement over the past seven years, with the respected Tankan survey reporting highs not seen since the 1980s bubble economy. Unemployment rates are falling, while Tokyo's residential and commercial land prices are rising. Construction cranes once again grace the central Tokyo skyline after years in enforced hibernation. Last year, Japan's gross domestic product growth roughly doubled that of the European Union.
Beneath this flood of revitalized economic indicators are three important transformations that mean this is not another false dawn but the sign of things to come. First, unlike in the stillborn expansions of 1993 and 1998, private demand, in the form of consumption and capital expenditure, is fueling growth. This time, fiscal consolidation is acting as a slight overall drag on the Japanese economy, as is the net export position.
Second, the ice age in bank lending is thawing. Last month, systemwide bank lending was in positive territory for the first time in more than five years. The major banks have cut their deadweight non-performing loans by two-thirds, freeing them up to lend again. Third, and most important, corporate balance sheets have finally recovered from the excesses of the bubble economy, whose collapse triggered a decade or more of debt retirement and corporate retraction.
Today, corporate debt is below pre-bubble levels and firms are borrowing to expand.
Deflation, the bugbear of Japan's long stagnation, appears to have been banished. Last week, the ultra-cautious Bank of Japan agreed to roll back its heterodox quantitative easing policy that has regularly pumped trillions of yen into the Japanese money supply. Officials are now contemplating the end of Japan's zero-interest-rate policy.
The end of quantitative easing and a return to positive nominal interest rates will put upward pressure on the yen. The currency may again challenge the 100-yen-to-$1 barrier that was last seriously tested more than a decade ago. A higher-interest, confident domestic economy will likely reduce the outflow of Japanese savings as returns at home improve. The economic recovery is boosting imports and encouraging Japanese firms to ramp up investment.
However, the recovery may reduce Japan's willingness to fund the indulgences of others, leading to downward pressure on Anglo-Saxon exchange rates and upward pressure on global interest rates. Japanese savers may no longer subsidize US profligacy.
These internal transformations and the changes to Japan's security environment are more structural than cyclical, meaning that Japan is likely to continue to grow more comfortable using its heft and acquiring more. In the next decade it is quite conceivable that a Japanese defense minister with leadership pretensions back home will be a regular visitor to Washington, Canberra, Singapore and beyond, promoting the newest Japanese military export and presenting the hardest line on China and North Korea. The US-Japan alliance would be stronger, more externally focussed, with Japan voicing its own national interest concerns more clearly. The United Nations may be poorer and China more fearful of containment.
Northeast Asia, the region with the largest number of powerful neighbors, is about to witness the greatest power game in the world, and Japan will not be watching from the sidelines.
Dr Malcolm Cook is the Asia-Pacific program director at the Lowy Institute for International Policy. Huw McKay is the senior international economist at Westpac Banking Corp.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/HC16Dh01.html